Introduction
Cultural evolution is a notion that describes social practices and beliefs as continually changing. While humans are in a continuous process of biological evolution, their sociocultural practices are also transforming. Particularly, practices of puritanical morality are changing due to cultural evolution. These are practices whereby one’s actions align with cultural standards of what is considered pure. Puritanical morality can be understood as a double-sided coin, with ideas about what is pure and good on one side, and ideas about what is disgusting and bad on the flip side. This paper will focus on the impact cultural evolution has on puritanical morality while also acknowledging variations in the way it manifests in different cultures across the globe. This is a topic of interest in contemporary society because it entails discussions about how different societies have different practices and why those who are not a member of a society may not understand the purpose of these practices.
A notable change to puritanical morality is the decline of its presence in Western societies. Cultural evolutionary theorists like Fitouchi, André and Baumard have proposed possible explanations for why Western practices are no longer, or significantly less, puritanical. However, in their explanation, the three co-authors propose that Western societies no longer need puritanical morality to remain orderly. They present the argument that Western culture has evolved, changing individuals’ psychologies to the extent that they are more disciplined than those of other societies. Consequently, this paper will argue that their approach towards non-Western societies is needlessly ethnocentric[1]. In doing so, an alternative approach will be formulated, conceptualising puritanical morality as a form of conventionality and, therefore, a single descriptor of cultural variation that does not make any society more advanced than another.
Therefore, this paper will begin with an examination of Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s approach to the fall of Western puritanical morality. In analysing the implicit assumptions made by these theorists, criticism of their argumentation will be formulated. Next, this paper will consider what exactly is meant by “puritanical morality”, resulting in the claim that it is a form of conventionality consisting of social norms. After establishing that puritanical morality practices are (often) not moral in an objective, righteous sense, this paper will explore the alternative account of declining Western puritanical morality. This exploration will include an explanation of why this approach overcomes the issues raised about Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s view, ultimately leading to the conclusion that cultural evolution has brought differing norms and practices to all societies, whereby none can be considered better than others.
The Fall of Puritanical Morality in the West
In order to investigate the perceived fall of puritanical morality practices in Western societies, one may consider the explanation proposed by Fitouchi, André and Baumard in their 2022 paper addressing the topic. Their publication, “Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality” (2022), reflects on the function of puritanical values in contemporary societies. They consider the extent of this function to vary from one society to another over time, resulting in the argument that specifically Western societies no longer need puritanical morality.
Nonetheless, before an accurate analysis of Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s explanation can be formulated, one must first examine what they consider to be puritanical morality. In the aforementioned paper, they describe puritanism as moral concerns “governing domains as various as sex, food, clothing, self-discipline, entertainments, and ritual observance” (2022, 6). In this sense, one’s mode of living may be significantly affected by the puritanical values upheld in the societal context in which they are situated. They also define puritanical morality as a strict, self-disciplinary “moralization of apparently victimless pleasures that humans crave” (2022, 4). Hence, people may desire to partake in some behaviours but abstain because the behaviour runs contrary to a moral sense of righteousness or purity.
Though, it is important to note that the rejection of many supposed cravings is historically present in most societies. Despite the seemingly negligible overlap in domains such as food and clothing, Fitouchi, André and Baumard refer to studies suggesting that over 80% of the world’s population adheres to the same puritanical values (2022, 6). This statistic is demonstrated by the use of religious and spiritual communities as examples. These are considered contexts where many puritanical values co-occur despite the domains in which they govern having little to no compositional overlap. Meanwhile, research conducted by Curry, Mullins and Whitehouse implies that seven values are believed to be morally good worldwide. They propose that some well-established, universal forms of cooperation result in these seven morals: family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, bravery, respect, fairness, and property rights (2019, 48). Their research further supports the claim that moral values and judgement thereof can transcend sociocultural contexts, at least to an extent. Therefore, Fitouchi, André and Baumard illustrate that puritanical morality entails many human societies adhering to a set of seemingly unrelated values. The fact that a significant portion of the world’s population historically agrees that some practices are inherently wrong is a crucial element of this paper since, as these authors note, puritanical morality seems to be related to cultural evolution.
Nonetheless, the cultural evolutionary approach in Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s paper attempts to explain the decline of puritanical morality in specifically Western societies. They borrow the term “WEIRD societies” from Henrich, referring to “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies” (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010, 1). From this point onwards, this paper will also borrow Henrich’s term. Before applying their explanation to WEIRD societies, Fitouchi, André and Baumard lay the groundwork for their argument. They claim that practising puritanical morality increases self-control because it allows people to “remain peaceful neighbors, faithful husbands and wives, industrious workers” (2022, 9). Consequently, the practices condemned by puritanical morality beliefs are perceived as socially harmful. Thus, at the core of their argument lies the notion that puritanical morality prevents social harm caused by people who otherwise lack self-control.
Next, Fitouchi, André and Baumard apply this principle to the declining puritanical morality practised in WEIRD societies. They claim that puritanical morality is costly, restricting some pleasures and imposing “effortful disciplinary activities” (2022, 35). Therefore, puritanical norms should only be warranted when the result is worth the cost. As such, the argument follows that the cost is appropriate in situations where “spontaneous self-control” is not enough to “ensure social order and acceptable levels of cooperation” (Fitouchi, André, and Baumard 2022, 35). Meanwhile, in what they describe as “rich environments” such as WEIRD societies, people generally have “more inherently self-controlled psychologies”, “invest more in extended prosociality”, “are less susceptible to impulsive defection or retaliation”, and “have higher trust in others” (2022, 35-36). In terms of cultural evolution, this argumentation implies that WEIRD people’s individual psychologies have progressed beyond the need for puritanical practices, as this decline is noticed in changing alcohol consumption patterns over the course of the past millennium (Vallee 1998, 80). In this particular example, alcohol use has rapidly transformed from a type of medicine to an indispensable source of calories, and, today, a regularly relied-upon “social lubricant” (Vallee 1998, 80-81).
Meanwhile, in formulating their argument, Fitouchi, André and Baumard refer to Michael Walzer’s publication, “Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology” (1963). He analyses a variety of case studies in which puritanical morality was considered helpful in maintaining social order. One particular study follows the punishment of poorly-behaved children who were believed to be deviating from puritanical norms. Although it is important to recognise that Walzer’s article is approximately sixty years old, he suggests that a father embodies the role of governing a family and disciplining the children. He argues that this role is due to an “extraordinary fear of disorder and anarchy” (Walzer 1963, 85). Fitouchi, André and Baumard apply their argumentation to Walzer’s analysis of this case by suggesting that weak-willed individuals who are “perpetually tempted by selfishness” (2022, 35) must rely on puritanical morality in order for their societies to function. They begin with the idea that (Western) authoritarian punishment, such as the father disciplining his children in Walzer’s case, leads to rich environments where people “view others as spontaneously cooperative” (Fitouchi, André, and Baumard 2022, 35). Therefore, members of these rich environments – hence, WEIRD societies – are believed to have started viewing each other as instinctively self-controlled and trustworthy.
Thus, Fitouchi, André and Baumard suggest that a fear of social disorder led to stricter disciplining of individuals who deviated from puritanical norms. The argument follows that this discipline and punishment has played a key role in WEIRD cultural evolution whereby individuals became inherently more self-controlled and trusting of others. Consequently, the three thinkers propose their explanation of the declining puritanical morality in the West on this basis.
Issues with Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s Account
Despite recognising cultural differences in puritanical morality today, Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s argumentation has considerable cultural evolutionary consequences. Particularly, in suggesting that WEIRD societies are more self-controlled, disciplined and trustworthy than non-WEIRD societies, they maintain a needlessly ethnocentric approach. Their argumentation leads to the implication that non-WEIRD people are less psychologically advanced and that they are falling behind WEIRD people in terms of cultural evolution. While it is the case that each society and culture has evolved in a unique way, Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s suggestion that individuals in WEIRD societies have evolved to better embody attributes such as trustworthiness and self-discipline appears to be implicitly biased.
The three authors are themselves situated in a WEIRD sociocultural context, meaning that they are accustomed to Western values and acquainted with Western development. Particularly, Western economic and industrial development has resulted in “living in highly dense urban population centres” (Heigham 2019). Although the emergence of densely populated areas is not a uniquely Western phenomenon, further research indicates that WEIRD people have relatively high expectations in problem-solving due to the abundance and wide accessibility of technology. Ecologist Steve Heigham suggests that Western individuals in close proximity to each other may be more compelled to adhere to social norms due to these high expectations (2019). Fitouchi, André and Baumard appear to take this approach, too, in suggesting that WEIRD people have become more trusting of others to adhere to these norms.
However, this approach to cultural evolution is disputable because the question of how much researchers’ experiences and personal sociocultural contexts influence their arguments remains unanswered. Undeniably, WEIRD people are more acquainted with WEIRD societal practices and behaviours. As Henrich explains in The Secret of Our Success (2016), some practices can only be understood at the group level. This means that often, one cannot know the function or meaning of a cultural practice unless one is a member of the group in which it is practised. The implication of these “causally opaque” (Henrich 2016, 68) practices is that Western authors like Fitouchi, André and Baumard can only understand the function and meaning behind Western practices, in the same way that Heigham explains the relation between norm adherence and technology reliance in problem-solving expectations. The mistake these approaches make is found in their comparisons to non-WEIRD societies because Western researchers can only make assumptions, usually laced with implicit ethnocentric bias, about practices outside of their own sociocultural context.
Hence, it follows that Fitouchi, André and Baumard attempt to explain the perceived fall of puritanical morality practices in WEIRD societies by comparing them to non-WEIRD societies whose practices cannot be understood by outsiders. Their bias may be unintentional, but since these authors are situated in a WEIRD sociocultural context, they are accustomed to and aware of specific changes in WEIRD norms. This paper is not necessarily claiming that these authors are uneducated or ignorant of changes in non-WEIRD cultural values. Instead, the aim here is to argue for an alternative explanation of the perceived fall of puritanism in WEIRD societies that is not needlessly ethnocentric. Thus, in the sections that follow, this paper will expand upon a cultural evolutionary approach that considers sociocultural norm variation while also acknowledging the significant co-occurrence of some moral values (Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse 2019, 48).
Are Puritanical “Morality” Practices Actually Related to Morality?
In order to conceptualise an alternative account of the supposed fall of puritanical morality in WEIRD societies, one may consider the extent to which puritanical behaviours are actually related to morality. This can be done through an analysis of moral disgust, the idea that humans feel revulsed at another human’s action that fails to “uphold the group or relationship norms” (Nabi 2010, 695-96). Furthermore, an ongoing discussion in several psychological and philosophy of mind domains concerns whether moral disgust is actually related to morality and ethics at all. This discussion plays a key role in discerning the “moral” aspect of puritanical morality since the public response to deviating from puritanical practices is a form of moral disgust. Examples of moral disgust in puritanical practices are seen in negative attitudes towards clothing considered too revealing and excessive alcohol consumption in public spaces. While this relatively short paper cannot divulge all aspects of the moral disgust debate, it will adopt the position that disgust is a matter of convention and use it as a starting point for an alternative account of Western puritanism, or lack thereof.
First, it is important to consider the core of the moral disgust debate. Like many researchers, Royzman and Kurzman conclude that moral disgust is “elusive” (2011, 270). In analysing a series of experiments, these researchers investigated the expression of moral dyspepsia – a feeling of sickness or disgust at another person’s behaviour. They aimed to analyse the hypothesis that feeling disgusted at someone else’s behaviour is the same kind of disgust induced by the sight of vomit and faeces, for example. While the results were inconclusive, several of the studies examined by Royzman and Kurzman demonstrate that when exposed to bad smells or tastes, the participants generally made more discernible facial expressions when they were aware of being observed (2011, 269-70). This suggests that the expression of disgust may function as a strategic signal. This is relevant to the moral disgust debate because moral disgust may also function as a strategic signal to in-group members, especially in children’s acquisition of social norms.
Moreover, in discussing the moral reasoning of WEIRD societies, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan consider the ways in which children develop moral values. Using the Kohlberg model, they illustrate that WEIRD children develop their moral reasoning in three stages: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010, 13). During the pre-conventional stage, these children distinguish between right and wrong based on internal standards and consequences – e.g., it is wrong to do something that causes pain. Next, in the conventional stage, morality is based on external standards that maintain the social order of the group – such as the father in Walzer’s case study that disciplined his disorderly children (Walzer 1963, 85). Lastly, WEIRD children enter the post-conventional stage where they no longer rely on another person to teach them how to behave. In this stage, they refer to “abstract ethical principles regarding justice and individual rights – the moral code inherent in most Western constitutions” (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010, 13). Though, it is essential to note that this moral code should also be considered a form of conventionality since it is a set of rules comprised of generally accepted standards or social norms.
In terms of the Kohlberg model, puritanical morality can also be considered part of the conventional and post-conventional stages. Despite governing domains that have seemingly little overlap (i.e., food, clothing, sex), puritanical morality functions as a set of generally accepted standards or norms. Puritanical practices may be adopted in the conventional stage, whereby the external standards of respected individuals influence children. Meanwhile, during the post-conventional stage, puritanical practices and values may be present if they play a significant role in the child’s sociocultural context and moral code. For example, Jonathan Haidt analyses puritanical practices in the Hebrew Bible containing “rules about food, menstruation, sex, skin, and the handling of corpses” (2012, 25). Although some may argue that the Hebrew Bible does not play as big of a role in the moral code of many Western societies today, it has significantly influenced this moral code historically. The puritanical morality found in the Hebrew Bible follows a logic of remaining “pure” because purity is associated with God, whereas impurity or dirtiness is associated with animals (Haidt 2012, 110). Haidt notes that disgust may also influence the logic of puritanism since there is often an emotional dimension seen in rules about eating “things that swarm upon the earth” (2012, 25). In this analysis, Haidt asks his reader to consider the emotional dimension in this logic by imagining a swarm of mice rather than a singular mouse, suggesting that induced feelings of disgust towards the possibility of certain actions (i.e., eating mice in this example) have been introduced and maintained by puritanical thinking.
Despite the Kohlberg model focussing on WEIRD children specifically, it can function as one possible description of the ways in which puritanical morality is a form of conventionality. Specifically, it is a useful description of how WEIRD societies maintained puritanical practices historically while allowing room for changes to normative sources such as external influences and moral codes. Meanwhile, the notion that moral disgust may be a form of strategic signalling is also useful in reconceptualising puritanical morality as conventionality. It can account for at least one aspect of introducing societal norms to children in any sociocultural context, alongside maintaining these norms. When a child successfully discerns a signal of disgust, especially displayed by respected and influential group members, they may also start using this signal. If this is the case for most people in a society, displaying disgust towards a certain behaviour becomes conventional. Therefore, applications of the Kohlberg model and disgust signalling can function as valuable descriptions of puritanical morality as conventionality.
Thus, the extent to which puritanical morality practices can really be considered a form of morality depends on a society’s conventions constituting what is believed to be moral. These practices are not moral in that they maintain behaviours necessarily and objectively right while condemning those necessarily and objectively wrong. Many people worldwide would disagree that wearing clothing made from two (or more) different fibres is necessarily wrong. Nevertheless, it is believed to be wrong by those in the sociocultural context whereby this clothing practice is condemned. This is an appropriate moment to reiterate Henrich’s claim that some practices are “causally opaque” (2016, 68), meaning that unless a practice is conventional in one’s own society, one may not understand its meaning or function. In this sense, puritanical morality is understood as a form of group-level conventionality whereby the righteousness of its practices is subjective to its context.
An Alternative Account of the Declining Puritanical Morality in the West
Thus far, this paper has argued that puritanical morality is not declining in WEIRD societies due to WEIRD people having more self-control and being more trusting of others. There must be another reason for this decline. It has also been argued that puritanical morality is a form of group-level conventionality rather than objective moral righteousness. Consequently, the next appropriate point of analysis entails an alternative account of the declining puritanical morality in the West that acknowledges it as a form of conventionality comprised of social norms. This alternative account begins by returning, again, to Henrich’s “causally opaque” practices (2016, 68).
In chapter seven of The Secret of Our Success, Henrich uses the processing technique of Tukanoan manioc in Amazonia as an example of a causally opaque practice (2016, 97-101). In this particular case, it is difficult to grow other crops, meaning that manioc is a large part of the Tukanoan people’s diet. Since consuming the roots of the plant can cause cyanide poisoning, it is important that children learn how to process it correctly. In this case, the young Tukanoan people learn how to process the roots from the previous generation, who had learnt from the generation of people before them, and so forth. Henrich illustrates that because these techniques work, those preparing the manioc are unaware that it can cause cyanide poisoning (2016, 98). Instead, they may believe that they are preparing it in a way that removes the bitter taste and reduces the likelihood of reactions like diarrhoea.
Moreover, the preparation process is rigorous and takes multiple days to complete. Therefore, Henrich asks his reader to imagine someone realising that one of the steps – boiling the manioc – is sufficient in only removing the bitter taste and possible reactions (2016, 99). Since they would be unaware that manioc consumption can cause cyanide poisoning, anyone who eats the food they prepare would eventually develop symptoms of such. However, despite the possibility that Tukanoan people could start experimenting with removing steps from this time-consuming process, they continue to use the techniques passed on for generations. While removing seemingly pointless steps may be the most commonsensical thing to do, the Tukanoan people have faith in the traditional processing method. For Henrich, this notion sits at the core of causally opaque practices because someone who is not a part of the group “cannot readily infer their functions, interrelationships, or importance” (2016, 99). Consequently, some cultural evolution practices can only be understood at the group level.
Henrich’s understanding of causally opaque practices in cultural evolution can be applied to puritanical morality practices. For instance, Haidt describes a US “virginity pledge movement” during the 1990s (2012, 156), whereby group members vowed to remain celibate until marriage. For individuals who were not part of this movement, it may be unclear why a vow of celibacy is important to the group. In this sense, someone with no affiliation to the group can only make assumptions about why vowing to remain celibate is important to its members. They may assume it is important in upholding religious values. In contrast, someone who is unfamiliar with references to celibacy in the Bible, for example, may assume it is important for another reason.
Meanwhile, Henrich’s notion is instrumental in formulating an explanation of the declining puritanical morality in WEIRD societies without ethnocentric undertones. The previous explanation examined in this paper is that of Fitouchi, André and Baumard, who claim that WEIRD people have culturally evolved to be more trusting of others and self-controlled, among other things (2022, 35-36). While it is likely that cultural evolution is responsible for the fall of Western puritanism, these authors make the mistake of comparing changes in Western cultural practices to non-Western cultural practices – often incomprehensible to those outside of their specific sociocultural context. Since Fitouchi, André and Baumard are WEIRD people, the argument that puritanical morality is present in non-WEIRD societies because their members are not disciplined enough to uphold social order without it is merely an assumption. Their argument fails to recognise that a (non-WEIRD) society may maintain a puritanical practice for causally opaque reasons.
Furthermore, Fitouchi, André and Baumard take an individualist approach to cultural evolution by focusing on one’s psychology in discussions surrounding discipline and impulsiveness. A key issue with this approach is its implication that WEIRD individuals have evolved to transcend the need for puritanical morality. This implication falls dangerously close to suggesting that WEIRD societies are comprised of individuals with a superior psychological makeup because they no longer need to rely on puritanical practices to function. However, Henrich provides a group-level analysis of cultural variation that accounts for the fact that many societies have at least some values in common. This alternative approach does not maintain a needlessly ethnocentric attitude because it suggests that the fall of Western puritanism is simply one descriptor of cultural variation and adaptation. It maintains that every society is culturally varied from another in some way, while none are comprised of more psychologically developed individuals than others.
A critical aspect of Henrich’s understanding of cultural evolution is that young learners and even adults “unconsciously attend to and preferentially learn from others” they consider successful, respected and prestigious members of their society (2016, 4). In this view, one’s values and behaviours stem from people they consider role models. This approach is highly compatible with the notion that puritanical morality is a form of conventionality because it is a set of social norms generally agreed upon within a society. Individuals adhere to these norms because the associated behaviours are learnt from respected members of one’s own group. Earlier in this paper, moral disgust is evaluated as a strategic signal, suggesting that it can account for introducing and maintaining societal norms in their particular sociocultural contexts. Therefore, moral disgust can be considered a feature of cultural evolution insofar as individuals discern and then replicate the signals of prestigious group members.
Similarly, the maintenance of particular sociocultural norms can be considered a form of overimitation in cultural variation. When exploring features of social learning, researchers Berl and Hewlett consider the function of overimitation. They begin their analysis by defining overimitation as “the high-fidelity copying of causally irrelevant actions in the presence of clear causal information” (2015, 2). Therefore, overimitating is the act of copying all of another’s actions exactly despite knowing that one or more of their actions is unnecessary. A simple example of overimitation is when two people buy bottled smoothies. The first person may shake their smoothie bottle five times in an up-and-down motion. When the second person observes this behaviour and also shakes their smoothie bottle five times in an up-and-down motion, they are overimitating. The second person did not necessarily need to mirror the first person’s actions, as shaking four times from left to right would have been adequate, too. While overimitation is not confirmed as a universal social learning feature in every society, it has been observed in a range of societies (Berl and Hewlett 2015, 4). Hence, overimitation appears to play a role in introducing and maintaining norm-adhering behaviours in at least some WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies.
In addition, puritanical morality practices can be considered a form of overimitation. This paper has established that puritanical morality may be considered a set of norms that govern seemingly unrelated domains like food and clothing. However, despite these domains having little to no overlap in their content, Fitouchi, André and Baumard illustrate that many societies adhere to the same set of norms (2022, 6). In this sense, it can be argued that individuals in certain sociocultural contexts overimitate when they practise puritanical morality. The reason why some people from various cultures consider both excessive public alcohol consumption and short skirts disgusting is unclear. Nonetheless, it is still the case that lots of different people from different societies agree with these same values. Hence, the practice of puritanical morality can be considered the overimitation of respected group members over generations. Following Henrich’s cultural evolution, one can consider the centuries-long, if not longer, overimitation of the same puritanical norms as other groups in terms of the formation of populations and new societies. Henrich explains that social institutions “integrated local groups into larger regional populations” (2016, 221). Therefore, cultures began to evolve in a new way when smaller groups joined to make larger societies. The social institutions he mentions play an important role because they are responsible for both the moral code seen in WEIRD children’s post-conventional stage of moral reasoning and the causally opaque practices seen in manioc preparation. Thus, despite the relatedness of puritanical norms being causally opaque, they appear to be overimitated as the prestigious members of some societies have upheld these values by learning from those prestigious in the generation before them, and so forth.
Next, one is left with the final question of how puritanism is falling in WEIRD societies if it continues to be overimitated in (some) other societies. To propose an answer to this question, one can return to the notion of social learning by observing and reproducing the behaviours of respected group members. In WEIRD societies today, many people respect and learn from influencers or celebrities (Heigham 2019). These celebrities’ behaviours are also imitated, from eating at restaurants they recommend to buying articles of clothing they are seen wearing – perhaps even in the same colour. Like puritanical practices, the relatedness of specific restaurants and specific items of clothing is causally opaque. In both WEIRD societies and societies that practice puritanical morality, the only observable aspect of this relatedness to those who are not a member of the group is the fact that successful and well-respected members also have these practices.
Therefore, when puritanical morality is understood as a form of conventionality rather than associating it with objective righteousness, a society may stop practising it, or some aspects of it, because it no longer plays a significant role in social norms. Consequently, this has led to an alternative account of declining puritanical morality in WEIRD societies that understands it as cultural evolution. In this sense, the presence of puritanical practices in a society is simply one descriptor of cultural variation and adaptation. This approach allows for a non-ethnocentric account of changing WEIRD practices. It argues that the respected members of WEIRD societies whose behaviours are overimitated simply behave differently from those in other societies. Hence, WEIRD people are not necessarily more disciplined and less impulsive; they have different, and not better, causally opaque practices.
Conclusion
Overall, this paper has criticised Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s explanation of declining puritanical morality in WEIRD societies and provided a non-ethnocentric alternative. The three authors demonstrate that although the domains of puritanical morality, such as clothing and food, are seemingly unrelated, a significant number of the world’s population practice these beliefs. They argue that puritanical morality is necessary for upholding social order because it makes individuals more self-controlled and disciplined. Without it, they suggest, a society’s social order is at risk because people may be tempted to pursue selfish pleasures such as adultery (Fitouchi, André, and Baumard 2022, 9). Hence, they believe that a WEIRD fear of social disorder caused stricter disciplining of individuals, which ultimately led to the redundancy and decline of puritanical morality.
However, this paper has argued that Fitouchi, André and Baumard’s explanation of the phenomenon is problematic. Their argumentation leads to the implication that non-WEIRD people have somewhat fallen behind WEIRD people in cultural evolution. Their approach is ethnocentric, especially since these authors are WEIRD. They cannot know the importance, meaning, or interrelationships of some non-WEIRD practices because they are not members of those groups. Hence, they appear to have an implicit bias in attempting to compare their understanding and experience of WEIRD practices to non-WEIRD practices that they cannot fully understand.
Consequently, this paper proposes an alternative account of declining puritanical practices in WEIRD societies. Starting from a conceptualisation of puritanical morality as a form of group-level conventionality, it has been argued that such practices are a set of societal norms rather than objective moral righteousness. Therefore, in applying Henrich’s ideas on cultural variation, this paper suggests that people acquire norms and practices via social learning. Causally opaque practices (Henrich 2016, 68) are learnt from prestigious and respected group members and may be passed on for generations, as seen in the preparation of Tukanoan manioc. This notion can be applied to puritanical morality since someone who is not a group member can only make assumptions about the group’s practices. Thus, Fitouchi, André and Baumard make the mistake of comparing WEIRD practices, of which they are a group member, to the assumptions they make about non-WEIRD practices.
The proposed alternative explanation understands the fall of puritanical morality in WEIRD societies as a matter of cultural variation. It argues that the presence of puritanical morality practices in a society is simply one descriptor of cultural variation and adaptation, whereby a WEIRD society simply overimitates and expresses different behaviours than a non-WEIRD society. Ultimately, this approach concludes that the cultural evolution of WEIRD societies has merely led to different, and not better, practices.
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[1] Defined by Merriam-Webster as “characterized by or based on the attitude that one’s own group is superior” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.).